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1 |  INTRODUCTION
According to Tears for Fears, “Everybody wants to rule the 
world.” Yet, according to The Beatles, “All you need is love.” 
Both songs get it partly right: The need for social status— 
defined as being respected and admired—and the need for 
social inclusion—defined as being liked and accepted—are 
both regarded as fundamental human motives (Anderson, 
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Abstract
Objective: Grounded in sociometer theory and hierometer theory, the current re-
search examined, for the first time, how within-person fluctuations in people's status 
and inclusion relate to their self-regard and interpersonal behavior.
Method: We conducted a 10-day diary study and analyzed the data using multilevel 
modeling. Participants (N = 415) completed daily measures of their status, inclusion, 
self-esteem, narcissism, assertiveness, and affiliativeness.
Results: On days when both their status and inclusion were higher, participants re-
ported higher self-esteem, but only on days when their status was higher did they 
report higher narcissism. Furthermore, on days when their self-esteem was higher, 
participants behaved more assertively and more affiliatively, but only on days when 
their narcissism was higher, did they behave more assertively. These patterns per-
sisted after controlling for baseline individual differences in all constructs. Self-
esteem, moreover, mediated the links between daily status and assertiveness, and 
between daily inclusion and affiliativeness; narcissism, in contrast, mediated the link 
between daily status and assertiveness only.
Conclusions: This research replicates at the within-person level empirical links pre-
viously found at the between-person level. The results suggest that narcissism oper-
ates chiefly as a hierometer (tracking status and regulating assertiveness), whereas 
self-esteem additionally operates as a sociometer (also tracking inclusion and regu-
lating affiliativeness).
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Hildreth, & Howland,  2015; Baumeister & Leary,  1995). 
Indeed, both motives are powerful and pervasive, with 
wide-ranging implications for cognition, emotion, and 
behavior (Anderson et  al.,  2015; Fiske,  2010; Gregg & 
Mahadevan,  2014; Leary,  2010). For example, consistent 
with status being fundamental, higher status predicts greater 
life satisfaction, more positive affect, and less anxiety and 
depression (Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner,  2012; 
Fournier,  2009; Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides,  2018). 
Likewise, consistent with inclusion being fundamental, 
higher inclusion predicts more positive affect, less anger 
and aggression, and less self-defeating behavior (Twenge, 
Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke,  2001; Twenge, Catanese, & 
Baumeister, 2002; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000).
1.1 | Within-person variability in 
status and inclusion
Much research to date has focused on between-person differ-
ences in status and inclusion. However, differences in status 
and inclusion may also be profitably assessed at the within-
person level. That is, not only may one person differ from 
another in their average level of status or inclusion, but also 
the same person may differ in their level of status or inclu-
sion from one occasion to another. However, little research 
has examined how within-person differences in status and 
inclusion relate to other key within-person differences—in 
particular, to how people evaluate themselves, and to how 
they behave interpersonally.
The current research is designed to remedy this defi-
ciency. We conducted a theoretically driven investigation 
into how within-person fluctuations in status and inclusion 
related to within-person fluctuations in self-regard and inter-
personal behavior. We grounded our investigation in two the-
ories—sociometer theory and hierometer theory (described 
below)—from which we systematically derived specific hy-
potheses to test empirically.
To help articulate these theories and hypotheses, we begin 
by clarifying some key terminology. First, we employ the term 
“social relations” to cover both status and inclusion as de-
fined above (Anderson et al., 2015; Fournier, 2009). Whereas 
status reflects where one stands vertically with respect to oth-
ers (i.e., in the social hierarchy), inclusion reflects where one 
stands horizontally with respect to others (i.e., in the social 
community) (cf. Black,  1976). Whereas hierometer theory 
focuses on status, sociometer theory focuses on inclusion. 
Second, we employ the term “self-regard” to cover two types 
of global self-evaluation—self-esteem (Rosenberg,  1965) 
and narcissism (Sedikides & Campbell, 2017). By “narcis-
sism,” we here mean its standard form—agentic or grandi-
ose narcissism—as opposed to its other postulated forms, 
such as pathological, vulnerable, or communal narcissism 
(Miller et al., 2010). Like self-esteem, grandiose narcissism 
is conceptualized as a continuously distributed trait (Miller 
& Campbell,  2010), and the two are distinguishable both 
conceptually (Brummelman, Thomaes, & Sedikides,  2016) 
and empirically (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & 
Rusbult, 2004). Whereas sociometer theory focuses on one 
type of self-regard, self-esteem, hierometer theory focuses 
on both, self-esteem and narcissism. Third, we employ the 
term “interpersonal behavior” to cover behavior falling along 
the two primary dimensions of the agency-communion cir-
cumplex (Abele & Wojciszke,  2014; Moskowitz,  1994; 
Wiggins,  1991): dominance-submission, labeled assertive-
ness; and friendliness-quarrelsomeness, labeled affiliative-
ness. Whereas hierometer theory focuses on assertiveness, 
sociometer theory focuses on affiliativeness.
The study of within-person variability in social rela-
tions, self-regard, and interpersonal behavior is important 
for several reasons. First, although people behave fairly con-
sistently over time, they also show considerable variation 
in their day-to-day behavior (Fleeson,  2001; Moskowitz & 
Zuroff, 2004). For example, the extent to which people be-
have assertively or affiliatively varies across days (Markey 
et al., 2015; Moskowitz & Zuroff, 2005). Likewise, people's 
self-esteem and narcissism vary across days (Giacomin & 
Jordan,  2016a, 2016b; Kernis,  2005). Hence, the study of 
such fluctuations contributes to a more comprehensive and 
nuanced understanding of psychosocial dynamics as a whole 
(Bleidorn,  2009; Fournier, Moskowitz, & Zuroff,  2008; 
La Guardia, Ryan, Couchman, & Deci, 2000; Mischel, 2004), 
just like the study of short-term fluctuations in weather (e.g., 
cloud formation) contributes to an understanding of atmo-
spheric dynamics beyond the study of long-term climate 
(e.g., global warming).
Second, this within-person variability is not simply ran-
dom error; rather, it correlates meaningfully with important 
outcomes. That is, the study of within-person variability adds 
predictive validity (Kernis, 2005), often due to the presence 
of situation-specific triggers (Fleeson, 2007; Mischel, Shoda, 
& Mendoza-Denton, 2002). For example, Lee (2014) found 
that daily variability in self-esteem, but not level of self- 
esteem, predicted different types of aggressiveness in 
children—specifically, higher levels of reactive aggression, 
but lower levels of proactive aggression.
Third, the study of within-person variability is important 
because findings at the between-person level do not necessar-
ily replicate at the within-person level (Wilson, Thompson, 
& Vazire,  2017). Indeed, the fallacious presumption that 
they should do so is one version of the ecological fallacy 
(Piantadosi, Byar, & Green,  1988). By way of analogy, 
consider typing speed (Hamaker,  2012). At the between- 
person level, typists who type faster also type more ac-
curately. This is because individual differences in typing 
ability produce a positive correlation between typing speed 
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and typing accuracy. However, at the within-person level, 
a given typist, when typing faster, will type less accurately; 
that is, a negative correlation emerges instead between typ-
ing speed and typing accuracy. This is because typing faster 
undermines typing accuracy (Heitz, 2014). Thus, the correla-
tion between typing speed and typing accuracy can differ—
indeed, even reverse—depending on whether one investigates 
it at the between-person level or at the within-person level. 
Hence, there is no substitute for empirically investigating 
within-person variability in its own right.
This concern—that between-person and within-person 
patterns of association have no reason to be identical—is not 
merely a statistical issue. It also has important theoretical 
implications. Both sociometer theory and hierometer theory 
posit that self-regard functionally tracks social inclusion/ 
status, respectively. But track relative to what? Implicitly 
(and sometimes explicitly), these theories invoke within- 
person associations (i.e., a given person having higher inclu-
sion/status on some occasions than on others). Yet, empirical 
tests of these theories have largely focused on between-per-
son differences, as though individuals evaluate their level of 
inclusion/status relative to the distribution of these variables 
in the sample or population at large. Here, we addressed this 
gap. We examined, for the first time, (a) how daily fluctu-
ations in status and inclusion relate to daily fluctuations in 
self-regard (i.e., self-esteem and narcissism), and (b) how 
daily fluctuations in self-regard relate to daily fluctuations 
in interpersonal behavior (i.e., assertiveness and affiliative-
ness). Below, we describe sociometer theory and hierometer 
theory and the rationale for our hypotheses.
1.2 | Sociometer theory and 
hierometer theory: Theoretical overview
Sociometer theory (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) 
links self-esteem to the need for inclusion (or equiva-
lently, the “need to belong;” Baumeister & Leary,  1995). 
Maintaining inclusion in social groups was arguably essential 
to the survival and reproduction of ancestral humans. When 
a particular need (e.g., for water) is essential, one or more 
systems (e.g., thirst) is liable to evolve to regulate its satisfac-
tion (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). Sociometer theory 
posits that self-esteem is part of one such system (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000).
More specifically, self-esteem may be characterized as 
serving two interrelated functions—indicative and imper-
ative. (The term “indicative”—from the Latin indicare “to 
point out”—refers to how some psychological variable in-
forms a person that their environment has some particular 
features. The term “imperative”—from the Latin imperare 
“to command”—refers to how some psychological variable 
impels a person to behave in particular ways.) For example, 
thirst functions both indicatively to inform people that they 
are H20 deprived, and imperatively to impel people to take 
a drink. Sociometer theory holds that the indicative function 
of self-esteem is to operate as a subjective gauge that tracks 
inclusion. Thus, lower inclusion should undermine self- 
esteem, whereas higher inclusion should bolster it. In addi-
tion, sociometer theory holds that the imperative function of 
self-esteem is to adaptively regulate inclusion-seeking behav-
ior. Thus, lower self-esteem, tracking lower inclusion, should 
motivate individuals to affiliate more strongly, to restore 
their inclusion level to an optimal state, whereas higher self- 
esteem, tracking higher inclusion, should not do so, as the 
need for inclusion has already been met. Putting both func-
tions together, sociometer theory holds that lower or higher 
levels of social inclusion, respectively, serve to reduce or in-
crease levels of self-esteem, which in turn, serve to provoke 
greater or lesser levels of behavioral affiliation, respectively 
(Leary, 2004).
It merits mention here that sociometer theory comes in 
two versions (see Mahadevan, Gregg, Sedikides, & De Waal-
Andrews,  2016, for additional discussion). Its original ver-
sion emphasizes social inclusion specifically: Self-esteem is 
a “marker of the degree to which the individual is being in-
cluded versus excluded by other people” (Leary et al., 1995, 
p. 519). A later version instead emphasizes how self-esteem 
tracks people's “relational value” more generally—the degree 
to which they are regarded by others as valuable or important 
overall (e.g., Leary, 2005, p. 82). Notably, neither version ex-
plicitly articulates a role for status. However, the advantage 
of the original version is its theoretical precision: It clearly 
delineates an inclusion-regulating function for self-esteem. 
In contrast, the later version is theoretically less precise: It 
can be reasonably interpreted as subsuming any character-
istic whatsoever that affords others some value, including, 
for example, gender-specific mating success (Schmitt & 
Jonason, 2019). Accordingly, because the original version of 
sociometer theory is more specific than the later version, and 
because the original version has been empirically tested most 
frequently (Leary, 2005), we use it to derive our hypotheses.
Hierometer theory, in contrast, links self-regard to the 
need for status (Anderson et al., 2015). In particular, it posits 
that self-regard is part of an evolved system that helps people 
to navigate status hierarchies adaptively (Mahadevan, Gregg, 
& Sedikides, 2019a, 2019b; Mahadevan et  al.,  2016). Like 
sociometer theory, hierometer theory holds that self-regard 
serves two interrelated functions, indicative and imperative. 
First, it holds that the indicative function of self-regard is to 
operate as subjective gauge that tracks status. Thus, lower 
status should undermine self-regard, whereas higher status 
should bolster it. Second, hierometer theory holds that the 
imperative function of self-regard is to adaptively regulate 
status-seeking behavior. However, the dynamics of hierom-
eter theory diverge from those of sociometer theory. Status, 
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unlike inclusion, is a rivalrous good (Cornes & Sandler, 1986). 
That is, whereas everyone in a group can simultaneously fit 
in, not everyone in a group can simultaneously stand out. 
Accordingly, individuals must compete for status, and may 
lose as well as win such competitions. It follows that status 
should be sought judiciously rather than indiscriminately: It 
is not adaptive to compete when one is liable to lose, nor to 
back down when one is liable to win (Gregg, Mahadevan, & 
Sedikides, 2017a). Furthermore, all else equal, a track record 
of winning is liable to predict future wins. Hence, prior higher 
status, by raising the likelihood of winning, makes asser-
tive status-promoting behavior more optimal, whereas prior 
lower status, by lowering the likelihood of winning, makes 
acquiescent status-protective behavior more optimal. Thus, 
the imperative function of self-regard, according to hierom-
eter theory, operates as follows: lower self-regard, tracking 
lower status, motivates individuals to behave less assertively, 
whereas higher self-regard, tracking higher status, motivates 
them to behave more assertively. Putting both functions to-
gether, hierometer theory holds that lower or higher levels 
of social status, respectively, serve to reduce or increase lev-
els of self-regard, which in turn, serve to provoke lesser or 
greater levels of behavioral assertiveness, respectively.
In summary, both sociometer and hierometer theory 
posit that self-regard serves a regulatory function. However, 
whereas sociometer theory pertains to social inclusion, 
hierometer theory pertains to social status. In addition, 
whereas sociometer theory focuses on one form of self- 
regard—self-esteem—hierometer theory focuses on two—self- 
esteem and narcissism. Finally, whereas sociometer theory 
articulates how more affiliative behavior might adaptively 
compensate for lower levels of inclusion, hierometer theory 
articulates how less or more assertive behavior might adap-
tively consolidate both lower and higher levels of status. 
Ultimately, the two theories may be integratively understood 
in terms of the overarching agency-communion distinction. 
Known as the “Big Two,” agency and communion constitute 
two basic dimensions in social cognition, embracing com-
petence-warmth, independence-interdependence, individu-
alism–collectivism, and competition-cooperation (Abele & 
Wojciszke,  2014). We consider status and assertiveness to 
fall under the superordinate dimension of agency, and inclu-
sion and affiliativeness to fall under the superordinate dimen-
sion of communion. Put another way, then, hierometer theory 
deals with self-regard's agentic function, sociometer theory 
with its communal one.
Putting both theories together, we can jointly frame our 
postulates as follows. On the one hand, we hypothesize that 
self-esteem operates as both hierometer and sociometer— 
tracking both status and inclusion, and motivating both 
assertive and affiliative behavior. On the other hand, we 
hypothesize that narcissism operates chiefly as a hierometer— 
tracking status alone and motivating assertive behavior 
alone. Several lines of research converge to make this fram-
ing plausible. For example, narcissists rate themselves as 
better-than-average on agentic traits (e.g., intelligence) but not 
on communal ones (e.g., morality), whereas high self-esteem 
individuals rate themselves as better-than-average on both 
(Bosson et al., 2008; Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; 
Krizan & Bushman,  2011). Additionally, at the level of 
between-person differences, higher status and higher inclu-
sion each independently predict higher self-esteem, whereas 
higher status alone (but not inclusion) independently predicts 
higher narcissism (Mahadevan et  al.,  2016, 2019a, 2019b). 
Finally, narcissism has been linked to the pursuit of status 
both theoretically and empirically (Grapsas, Brummelman, 
Back, & Denissen, 2019; Zeigler-Hill et al., 2019).
1.3 | Sociometer theory and 
hierometer theory: Empirical evidence
Earlier, we gave several reasons why it is relevant to ex-
amine within-person variability: that such variability is 
(a) substantial in itself, (b) independently predictive, and 
(c) nonredundant with between-person variability. In addi-
tion, (d) sociometer theory and hierometer theory have so 
far been tested mainly at the between-person level. As the 
previous section outlines, both theories posit that psycho-
logical self-regard tracks people's social relations so as to 
regulate their interpersonal behavior. But the question natu-
rally arises: track them relative to what? The most intuitive 
answer is: track them relative to other occasions on which 
their inclusion or status were either higher, lower, or the 
same. That is, both theories primarily invoke, as the basis 
of their fundamental dynamics, within-person comparisons 
in which one temporary state of affairs is weighted against 
another. Indeed, sociometer theory and hierometer theory 
might be held to apply most naturally in such situations. Few 
studies, however, have tested sociometer theory (Denissen, 
Penke, Schmitt, & Van Aken, 2008; Reitz, Motti-Stefanidi, 
& Asendorpf, 2016; Srivastava & Beer, 2005), and none have 
tested hierometer theory, at the within-person level.
Sociometer theory has been tested mainly at the 
between-person level. Providing good support for its hypoth-
esized indicative function, studies show that socially included 
people subsequently report higher state self-esteem than so-
cially excluded ones (Bourgeois & Leary,  2001; Buckley, 
Winkel, & Leary, 2004). Additionally, people who feel that 
others generally like and accept them report higher trait 
self-esteem than people who feel that others generally dis-
like and reject them (Leary & Macdonald, 2003; Macdonald, 
Saltzman, & Leary, 2003). Providing mixed support for its 
hypothesized imperative function, however, some studies 
show that social exclusion and low self-esteem prompt af-
filiative behavior, whereas other studies do not. On the one 
   | 5MAHADEVAN Et Al.
hand, socially excluded people are more likely to conform to 
group opinions (Williams et al., 2000) and to report a greater 
desire for social connection (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & 
Schaller,  2007). On the other hand, socially excluded peo-
ple are more likely to be hostile and aggressive (Twenge, 
Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels,  2007) and low 
self-esteem individuals are less likely to initiate new relation-
ships than high self-esteem individuals (Anthony, Wood, & 
Holmes, 2007).
A few studies have tested sociometer theory at the with-
in-person level. For example, Denissen et  al.  (2008) found 
that people reported higher self-esteem on days when they 
felt more included by others. Likewise, Srivastava and Beer 
(2005) and Reitz et al.  (2016) found that others' liking and 
peer-perceived popularity predicted higher self-esteem. 
However, these studies did not test sociometer theory's im-
perative function—that is, how within-person fluctuations in 
daily inclusion and daily self-esteem relate to within-person 
fluctuations in daily affiliativeness. Furthermore, they were 
not designed to test hierometer theory, so they did not assess 
nor control for daily status and daily assertiveness.
Given its relative novelty, hierometer theory has so far 
only been tested at the between-person level. In support of 
its hypothesized indicative function, individuals led to be-
lieve that others respect and admire them subsequently re-
port higher levels of state self-esteem and narcissism (Gregg 
et al., 2018; Mahadevan et al., 2019a). In addition, individu-
als who perceive that others, on average, respect and admire 
them (i.e., accord them higher status) report higher levels 
of trait self-esteem and narcissism (Mahadevan et al., 2016, 
2019b). Moreover, in support of its hypothesized impera-
tive function, higher trait self-esteem and narcissism both 
correlate positively with assertive behavior (Mahadevan 
et al., 2016). However, hierometer theory remains to be tested 
at the within-person level.
In sum, few studies have tested sociometer theory, and 
none have tested hierometer theory, at the within-person level. 
Thus, how within-person fluctuations in daily status and 
inclusion relate to within-person fluctuations in daily self- 
regard and interpersonal behavior remains to be established.
1.4 | The current research
Here, for the first time, we concurrently tested hypotheses 
from both sociometer and hierometer theory at the within-
person level. We employed a daily diary design over a 10-day 
period and analyzed the data using multilevel modeling. By 
means of carefully crafted enquiries, we examined (a) how 
daily fluctuations in social relations (i.e., status and inclusion) 
related to daily fluctuations in self-regard (i.e., self-esteem 
and narcissism), and (b) how daily fluctuations in self-re-
gard related to daily fluctuations in interpersonal behavior 
(i.e., assertiveness and affiliativeness). Furthermore, we 
additionally analyzed all these relationships once between-
person trait-level individual differences in the same constructs 
were taken into account, in order to isolate within-participant 
variability specifically (cf. Lee, 2014).
In accord with hierometer theory, we hypothesized that, 
(i) on days when participants' status was higher (vs. lower), 
they would show higher (vs. lower) self-esteem and narcis-
sism, and (ii) on days when participants' self-esteem and 
narcissism were higher (vs. lower), they would behave more 
(vs. less) assertively. In accord with sociometer theory, we 
hypothesized that, (iii) on days when participants' inclusion 
was higher (vs. lower), they would show higher (vs. lower) 
self-esteem, and (iv) on days when participants' self-esteem 
was higher (vs. lower), they would behave less (vs. more) 
affiliatively.
Furthermore, we investigated the mediating role of 
self-regard. In accord with hierometer theory, we hypothe-
sized that (v) daily fluctuations in both self-esteem and nar-
cissism would statistically mediate the link between daily 
fluctuations in status and daily fluctuations in assertiveness. 
In accord with sociometer theory, we hypothesized that (vi) 
daily fluctuations in self-esteem, but not narcissism, would 
statistically mediate the link between daily fluctuations in in-
clusion and daily fluctuations in affiliativeness.
2 |  METHOD
2.1 | Participants and procedure
Participants initially completed a baseline survey online on 
their computer or mobile phone. Thereafter, every day, for 
the next 10 days, they completed short daily surveys, also on-
line, and on their computer or mobile phone. All the surveys 
were hosted on the QualtricsTM platform. The link to each 
daily survey was emailed to participants at 4 p.m. each day, 
followed by a reminder at 9 p.m. each day.
The study—open to all adults (18+) fluent in English—
was advertised on University notice boards and via a research 
recruitment intranet. Participants comprised psychology 
students taking part for course credit as well as nonstudent 
volunteers (relative numbers unknown). A total of 415 partic-
ipants completed at least one survey, resulting in 2,582 obser-
vations. Of these, 325 participants (244 women, 80 men, and 
1 unreported) completed the baseline survey. They ranged in 
age from 18 to 66 years (M = 25.84, SD = 9.89). Their eth-
nic backgrounds were: White (46.5%), South Asian (12.6%), 
East Asian (11.7%), Hispanic (11.7%), Black (9.5%), and 
Other (8.0%). On average, participants completed 5.43 daily 
surveys (Median = 7.00, SD = 4.13).1 This sample size al-
lowed us to detect small-to-medium effects (range r = .07 to 
.18) with a high power of (1 − β) = .95 at α = .05 (two-tailed).
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2.2 | Baseline measures
Participants completed the following measures as part of the 
baseline survey. We averaged item scores for all measures, 
with higher scores indicating higher levels of the correspond-
ing construct.
2.2.1 | Status
Participants completed an 8-item social status measure (Huo, 
Binning, & Molina,  2010; Mahadevan et  al.,  2016, 2019a, 
2019b). It began with the stem, “Most of the time I feel that 
people...” Sample items include: “…respect my achieve-
ments,” “…admire me,” and “…see me as an important per-
son” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; M = 3.36; 
SD = 0.66; α = .89).
2.2.2 | Inclusion
Participants completed a parallel 9-item social inclusion 
measure (Huo et al., 2010; Mahadevan et al., 2016, 2019a, 
2019b). It began with the same stem as above. Sample items 
include: “…like me as a person,” “…feel warmly towards 
me,” and “…accept me” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree; M = 3.85; SD = 0.56; α = .89).
2.2.3 | Self-esteem
Participants completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSES; Rosenberg,  1965). The RSES comprises 10 items, 
five worded positively and five worded negatively. Sample 
items include: “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself,” 
and “At times I think I am no good at all (reverse-scored)” 
(1  =  strongly disagree, 5  =  strongly agree; M  =  3.48; 
SD = 0.70; α = .87).
2.2.4 | Narcissism
Participants completed the 40-item Narcissistic Personality 
Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988; M = 3.10; SD = 0.57; 
α = .87). Its original items consist of pairs of statements—
narcissistic versus non-narcissistic—which respondents 
choose between (e.g., “I think I am a special person” vs. “I am 
no better or worse than most people”). Here, we retained the 
item content, but altered the response format. In particular, 
we used a 6-point bipolar scale to capture degrees of endorse-
ment of one statement versus the other. The narcissistic state-
ment in each pair appeared on one end of the scale, and the 
non-narcissistic statement appeared on the other. The absence 
of a scale mid-point retained the “trade-off” feature of the 
original NPI while affording the possibility of more sensitive 
measurement (Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 2017b; Lee, 
Gregg, & Park, 2013). Other researchers have adopted simi-
lar formats when assessing narcissism (Pincus et al., 2009), 
and found them psychometrically superior to the standard 
paired-item format (Grosz et al., 2017).
2.2.5 | Assertiveness and affiliativeness
Participants completed the 48-item Social Behavior Inventory 
(SBI; Moskowitz, 1994; 1 = very unlike me, 6 = very like me). 
The SBI assesses interpersonal behavior along two dimen-
sions: assertiveness (ranging from dominance to submis-
siveness) and affiliativeness (ranging from friendliness 
to quarrelsomeness). It consists of four 12-item subscales 
that measure dominant, submissive, friendly, and quarrel-
some behavior, respectively. Sample items are: “I speak in 
a clear, firm voice” (dominant), “I do not express disagree-
ment” (submissive), “I compliment or praise other people” 
(friendly), and “I criticise others” (quarrelsome). The SBI's 
reliability and validity has been demonstrated in a variety of 
contexts (Moskowitz, 1994). All four subscales proved reli-
able (dominance: α = .81; submissiveness: α = .88; friend-
liness: α =  .86; quarrelsomeness: α =  .84). In accord with 
previous practice (Mahadevan et  al.,  2016; Moskowitz & 
Zuroff, 2005; Roche, Pincus, Hyde, Conroy, & Ram, 2013), 
and the standard circumplex models (Moskowitz,  1994; 
Wiggins, 1991), we operationalized behavioral assertiveness 
by subtracting mean scores on the submissiveness subscale 
from those on the dominance subscale (M = 0.54; SD = 1.32), 
and behavioral affiliativeness by subtracting mean scores on 
the quarrelsomeness subscale from those on the friendliness 
subscale (M = 1.91; SD = 1.15).
2.3 | Daily diary measures
Participants completed the following daily diary measures. 
They received the instruction: “Now, we would like you 
to reflect upon your day today. Think about what occurred 
and how you felt and acted. There are no right or wrong an-
swers. Please answer honestly. Your responses are strictly 
confidential.”
2.3.1 | Status
Participants indicated their daily status by reporting whether 
a series of status-relevant events had occurred on that day 
(cf. Giacomin & Jordan, 2016a; Huo et al., 2010). The events 
were: “Were you assigned to an important role in a group?”, 
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“Did you receive any recognition?”, “Did you feel that people 
respected you?”, “Did you feel that someone admired you?”, 
“Did people treat you as someone important?”, “Did peo-
ple seem to think highly of your abilities and talents?”, and 
“Did you feel that people saw you as someone successful?” 
Responses were dichotomous (1 = yes, 0 = no; M = 0.58, 
SD = 0.34, αmean = .83, αrange = .76–.87).2
2.3.2 | Inclusion
Likewise, participants indicated their daily inclusion by re-
porting whether a series of inclusion-relevant events had 
occurred that day (cf. Giacomin & Jordan,  2016a; Huo 
et al., 2010). The events were: “Did people include you in 
their social groups and activities?”, “Were people friendly 
towards you?”, “Did you feel that people liked you?”, “Did 
you feel accepted by others?”, “Did you feel like you fitted 
in?”, “Did people seem to feel warmly towards you?” and 
“Did people seem to see you as a nice person?” Responses 
were dichotomous (1 = yes, 0 = no; M = 0.89, SD = 0.23, 
αmean = .86, αrange = .81–.91).
2.3.3 | Self-esteem
Participants indicated their daily self-esteem on three items 
(Mahadevan, Gregg, & Sedikides,  2020; Robins, Hendin, 
& Trzesniewski, 2001; M = 5.51, SD = 1.63, αmean =  .94, 
αrange = .91–.96). The items were: “How do you feel about 
yourself?” (1 = very negative, 8 = very positive), “How do 
you feel about yourself?” (1 = very bad, 8 = very good), and 
“I have high self-esteem” (1 = strongly disagree, 8 = strongly 
agree). These items assess state self-esteem reliably and val-
idly (Mahadevan et al., 2020; Robins et al., 2001).
2.3.4 | Narcissism
Participants indicated their daily narcissism on 11 adjec-
tives (Giacomin & Jordan,  2016b; M  =  2.34, SD  =  1.06, 
αmean =  .91, αrange =  .87–.93). The adjectives were: egotis-
tical, self-focused, vain, manipulative, attention-seeking, ar-
rogant, narcissistic, self-centered, conceited, self-indulgent, 
and selfish (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). These 
items assess state narcissism reliably and validly (Giacomin 
& Jordan, 2016b).
2.3.5 | Assertiveness
Participants indicated how assertively they had behaved that 
day (cf. Moskowitz,  1994). The assertive behaviors were: 
“I spoke in a clear, firm voice,” “I took the lead in planning 
or organizing a project or activity,” “I made suggestions,” 
“I asked others to volunteer or assigned others to tasks,” “I 
stood up for myself,” “I formed my own opinions,” “I stood 
firm in my decisions,” “I made my own plans or decisions,” 
and “I expressed my opinions.” Responses were dichoto-
mous (1 = yes, 0 = no; M = 0.72, SD = 0.28, αmean = .83, 
αrange = .75–.88).
2.3.6 | Affiliativeness
Participants indicated how affiliatively they had behaved that 
day (cf. Moskowitz, 1994). The affiliative behaviors were: “I 
complimented or praised someone,” “I smiled and laughed 
with others,” “I expressed affection with words or gestures,” 
“I showed sympathy,” “I expressed reassurance,” “I did 
something caring for someone else,” “I helped someone with 
a problem.” Responses were dichotomous (1 = yes, 0 = no; 
M = 0.79, SD = 0.27, αmean = .79, αrange = .67–.85).
3 |  RESULTS
3.1 | Data analytic strategy
The goals of this research were (a) to document whether 
and to what extent within-person fluctuations in three types 
of variable—social relations, self-regard, and interpersonal 
behavior—existed, and (b) to examine whether and to what 
extent these within-person fluctuations corresponded with 
hypotheses derived from sociometer theory and hierometer 
theory. Accordingly, we were interested in how, over the 
course of several days, status, inclusion, self-esteem, nar-
cissism, assertiveness, and affiliativeness (a) varied within- 
person and (b) covaried within-person. We did not hypoth-
esize specific trends over time (e.g., a linear or quadratic 
increase in status or inclusion as days progressed), nor we 
formulate hypotheses regarding the durability or time-onset 
of effects (e.g., the impact of status or inclusion on self-
esteem from one day to the next).3 Accordingly, multilevel 
modeling (MLM) represented the most appropriate tool to 
test our hypotheses (as opposed to, say, cross-lagged anal-
yses or growth modeling). Its use was also consistent with 
past research addressing similar questions (Giacomin & 
Jordan, 2016a, 2016b; Heller, Komar, & Lee, 2007; Wilson 
et al., 2017). Furthermore, MLM allows for the analysis of 
all available data and is robust to missing data (weaknesses 
that can compromise other analytic techniques, such as cross-
lagged analyses; Kearney, 2017; Snijders & Bosker, 2004).
We used random-intercept MLM analyses (Singer, 1998). 
The daily data (Level 1) were nested within participants 
(Level 2). These analyses allowed us to partition variance in a 
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dependent variable (e.g., self-esteem) at the between-person 
and within-person level. Between-person variance reflects 
the distribution of people's scores relative to the population 
average. Within-person variance, on the contrary, reflects the 
distribution of people's daily scores relative to their overall 
score. Specifically, random-intercept models, here illustrated 
with a single predictor, follow the structure4:
We tested our hypotheses (i) through (vi) in four stages of 
increasing complexity, both without, and then, with covari-
ates, as recommended by Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn 
(2011). First, we computed the zero-order within-person as-
sociations between the daily indices by regressing—in the 
aforementioned multilevel analysis—the relevant outcomes 
on the relevant predictors (i.e., each index of self-regard 
on each index of social relations; and each index of inter-
personal behavior on each index of self-regard). Second, 
we recomputed each of these daily within-person associ-
ations after jointly controlling for the two concurrent daily 
indices (e.g., the daily status–daily narcissism association 
controlled for daily inclusion and daily self-esteem, and the 
daily narcissism–daily assertiveness association controlled 
for daily self-esteem and daily affiliativeness). Third, we 
again computed each of these daily within-person associa-
tions, but after further controlling for participants' baseline 
scores on the trait measures to see if within-person fluctua-
tions in daily status and inclusion continued to predict fluc-
tuations in daily self-regard and interpersonal behavior after 
accounting for baseline individual differences in these con-
structs (Geiser,  2013; Lee,  2014). Finally, we tested, using 
tests of multilevel mediation (Hayes, 2013), whether and to 
what extent daily fluctuations in self-esteem and narcissism 
mediated the association between daily fluctuations in status 
and assertiveness, and daily fluctuations in inclusion and af-
filiativeness. In all analyses, we controlled for measurement 
day (1 through 10) to account for the possibility that some 
days might be linked to different responses (e.g., people pre-
senting themselves more favorably on the first day; Bolger & 
Laurenceau, 2013; Snijders & Bosker, 2004).
3.2 | Within-person variability
Before proceeding to the main analyses, we examined 
whether status and inclusion varied within-person over 
the 10-day period. Attesting to the potential importance of 
such within-person variability, a considerable proportion of 
the variance in both status and inclusion emerged within-
person (status: 50%; inclusion: 60%). That is, participants 
experienced nontrivial fluctuations in their status and inclu-
sion over relatively short periods of time. Likewise, and con-
sistent with previous research (Giacomin & Jordan, 2016a, 
2016b; Kernis,  2005; Markey et  al.,  2015), we observed 
considerable within-person variations in self-regard (self-
esteem: 40%; narcissism: 27%) and interpersonal behavior 
(assertiveness: 93%; affiliativeness: 64%). Accordingly, our 
key constructs exhibited promising levels of within-person 
variability whose mutual interrelations could be profitably 
explored.
3.3 | Social relations and self-regard: 
Tests of indicative function
In the first set of analyses, we tested whether our data were 
consistent with the indicative function of self-regard postu-
lated by sociometer and hierometer theory. Specifically, we 
tested using MLM whether daily fluctuations in status and 
inclusion related in the hypothesized way to daily fluctua-
tions in self-esteem and narcissism (Table 1).
3.3.1 | Zero-order associations
Daily status covaried positively with daily self-esteem. It 
also did so with daily narcissism. Likewise, daily inclusion 
covaried positively with daily self-esteem. However, daily 
inclusion did not covary positively with daily narcissism. 
Thus, on days when their status was higher (vs. lower), par-
ticipants manifested higher (vs. lower) self-esteem and nar-
cissism; however, on days when their inclusion was higher 
(vs. lower), participants manifested only higher (vs. lower) 
self-esteem (Table 1, upper panel).
3.3.2 | Adjusted associations I
Next, we examined the same four associations—between 
each of the two daily indices of social relations and each of 
the two daily indices of self-regard—after simultaneously 
controlling for the other two daily indices. The same pattern 
of findings emerged (Table 1, middle panel).
3.3.3 | Adjusted associations II
Subsequently, we added a further layer of statistical adjust-
ment. Specifically, we examined the above set of adjusted as-
sociations, but after additionally controlling for participants' 
baseline scores on the trait measures of status, inclusion, self-
esteem, and narcissism. Regardless, the same pattern of find-
ings persisted (Table 1, bottom panel).
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3.3.4 | Discussion
Supporting hierometer theory, on days when participants' 
status was higher (vs. lower), their self-esteem and narcis-
sism were too. Supporting sociometer theory, on days when 
participants' inclusion was higher (vs. lower), their self- 
esteem was too.5 These patterns held both with and without 
controlling for the other daily indices and for baseline traits. 
Thus, hypotheses (i) and (iii) were confirmed at the within-
person level. These findings conceptually replicate previous 
ones obtained at the between-person level (Mahadevan et al., 
2016, 2019a, 2019b).
3.4 | Self-regard and interpersonal 
behavior: Tests of imperative function
In the second set of analyses, we tested whether our data were 
consistent with the imperative function of self-regard postu-
lated by sociometer and hierometer theory. Specifically, we 
tested using MLM whether daily fluctuations in self-esteem 
and narcissism related in the hypothesized way to daily fluc-
tuations in assertiveness and affiliativeness (Table 2).
3.4.1 | Zero-order associations
Daily self-esteem covaried positively with daily assertive-
ness. So too did daily narcissism. Daily self-esteem covaried 
positively with daily affiliativeness. However, daily narcis-
sism did not covary positively with daily affiliativeness. 
Thus, on days when their self-esteem or narcissism were 
higher (vs. lower), participants showed higher (vs. lower) as-
sertiveness; however, only on days when their self-esteem 
was higher (vs. lower), did participants show higher (vs. 
lower) affiliativeness (Table 2, upper panel).
3.4.2 | Adjusted associations I
Next, we examined the same four associations—between 
each of the two daily indices of self-regard and each of the 
T A B L E  1  MLM analyses of the within-person associations between daily status, daily inclusion, daily self-esteem, and daily narcissism
Covariates Variables γ SE t p 95% CI
Effect 
size (r)
None Daily status–daily 
self-esteem
1.82 0.09 21.11 <.001 [1.65, 1.99] .42
Daily status–daily 
narcissism
0.13 0.05 2.68 .007 [0.04, 0.23] .10
Daily inclusion–daily 
self-esteem
2.34 0.11 20.48 <.001 [2.11, 2.56] .44
Daily inclusion–daily 
narcissism
0.03 0.07 0.44 .657 [−0.10, 0.16] .01
Daily indicesa Daily status–daily 
self-esteem
1.33 0.09 14.70 <.001 [1.15, 1.50] .28
Daily status–daily 
narcissism
0.12 0.06 2.19 .029 [0.01, 0.24] .09
Daily inclusion–daily 
self-esteem
1.65 0.12 13.95 <.001 [1.42, 1.88] .31
Daily inclusion–daily 
narcissism
−0.07 0.07 −0.99 .321 [−0.22, 0.07] .03




1.28 0.09 13.65 <.001 [1.10, 1.47] .25
Daily status–daily 
narcissism
0.11 0.06 1.82 .069 [−0.01, 0.22] .05
Daily inclusion–daily 
self-esteem
1.57 0.12 12.93 <.001 [1.33, 1.81] .27
Daily inclusion–daily 
narcissism
−0.04 0.08 −0.50 .619 [−0.19, 0.11] .00
aControlling for daily covariation in the other two concurrently assessed daily indices. For example, the association between daily status and daily self-esteem 
controlled for daily inclusion and daily narcissism. 
bAdditionally controlling for between-person trait levels of all four indices assessed at baseline (i.e., baseline status, inclusion, self-esteem, and narcissism). 
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two daily indices of interpersonal behavior—after simultane-
ously controlling for the other two daily indices. The same 
pattern of findings emerged (Table 2, middle panel).
3.4.3 | Adjusted associations II
Again, we added a further layer of statistical adjustment. 
Specifically, we examined the above set of adjusted associa-
tions, but after additionally controlling for participants' base-
line scores on the trait measures of self-esteem, narcissism, 
assertiveness, and affiliativeness. Regardless, the same pat-
tern of findings persisted (Table 2, bottom panel).
3.4.4 | Discussion
Supporting hierometer theory, on days when participants' 
self-esteem and narcissism were higher (vs. lower), their 
assertiveness was higher (vs. lower) too. However, con-
tradicting sociometer theory, on days when participants' 
self-esteem was higher (vs. lower), their affiliativeness was 
too (the inverse pattern being expected). These patterns held 
both with and without controlling for the other daily indices 
and for baseline traits. Thus, hypothesis (ii) was confirmed 
at the within-person level, whereas hypothesis (iv) was not. 
However, the reversed pattern obtained for self-esteem and 
affiliativeness is still potentially consistent with self-esteem 
serving some indicative function. These findings conceptu-
ally replicate previous ones obtained at the between-person 
level (Mahadevan et al., 2016, 2019a, 2019b).
3.5 | Mediations by self-regard: Joint 
tests of indicative and imperative functions
In the final set of analyses, we used multilevel mediation 
(Hayes,  2013) to examine how daily fluctuations in social 
relations, self-regard, and interpersonal behavior interre-
late. We tested whether (a) there existed any links between 
daily fluctuations in social relations and daily fluctua-
tions in interpersonal behavior, and (b) whether such links 
T A B L E  2  MLM analyses of the within-person associations between daily self-esteem, daily narcissism, daily assertiveness, and daily 
affiliativeness
Covariates Variables γ SE t p 95% CI
Effect 
Size (r)
None Daily self-esteem–daily 
assertiveness
0.07 0.004 19.62 <.001 [0.07, 0.08] .42
Daily narcissism–daily 
assertiveness
0.04 0.01 5.38 <.001 [0.03, 0.05] .11
Daily self-esteem–daily 
affiliativeness
0.07 0.01 17.41 <.001 [0.06, 0.07] .34
Daily narcissism–daily 
affiliativeness
0.01 0.01 0.93 .355 [−0.01, 0.02] .00
Daily indicesa Daily self-esteem–daily 
assertiveness
0.05 0.004 13.40 <.001 [0.04, 0.06] .30
Daily narcissism–daily 
assertiveness
0.03 0.01 5.27 <.001 [0.02, 0.04] .12
Daily self-esteem–daily 
affiliativeness
0.04 0.004 9.98 <.001 [0.03, 0.05] .14
Daily narcissism–daily 
affiliativeness
−0.01 0.01 −1.84 .066 [−0.02, 0.001] .05




0.05 0.004 11.17 <.001 [0.04, 0.05] .23
Daily narcissism–daily 
assertiveness
0.03 0.01 4.21 <.001 [0.01, 0.04] .07
Daily self-esteem–daily 
affiliativeness
0.04 0.004 9.46 <.001 [0.03, 0.05] .14
Daily narcissism–daily 
affiliativeness
−0.01 0.01 −1.56 .119 [−0.02, 0.003] .05
aControlling for daily covariation in the two concurrently assessed daily indices. For example, the association between daily self-esteem and daily assertiveness 
controlled for daily narcissism and daily affiliativeness. 
bAdditionally controlling for between-person trait levels of all four indices assessed at baseline (i.e., baseline self-esteem, narcissism, assertiveness, and affiliativeness). 
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could be accounted for by daily fluctuations in self-regard. 
Specifically, we tested whether the daily status–daily asser-
tiveness link was statistically mediated by daily self-esteem 
and daily narcissism—hypothesis (v); and whether the daily 
inclusion–daily affiliativeness link was statistically mediated 
by daily self-esteem, but not by daily narcissism—hypothesis 
(vi).
3.5.1 | Did self-esteem mediate the link 
between status and assertiveness?
Daily fluctuations in status covaried positively with daily 
fluctuations in assertiveness. Furthermore, daily fluctuations 
in assertiveness covaried positively with daily fluctuations 
in self-esteem independently of daily fluctuations in status, 
γ = 0.04, SE = 0.004, t(2,249) = 11.20, p < .001, 95% CI [0.03, 
0.05], and vice versa, γ = 0.37, SE = 0.02, t(2,249) = 21.35, 
p < .001, 95% CI [0.33, 0.40]. As a final step, we tested the 
indirect effect of status (the predictor) on assertiveness (the 
outcome) via self-esteem (the potential mediator). We treated 
paths a (predictor-to-mediator) and b (mediator-to-outcome) 
as fixed effects and used the MCMED macro (Hayes, 2013) 
to construct 95% Monte Carlo confidence intervals (CI) 
for the indirect effect. Crucially, the indirect path ab— 
quantifying mediation by self-esteem—attained significance, 
ab  =  0.08, 95% CI  =  [0.06, 0.09].6 This finding supports 
hierometer theory.
3.5.2 | Did narcissism mediate the link 
between status and assertiveness?
As noted above, daily fluctuations in status covaried posi-
tively with daily fluctuations in assertiveness. Furthermore, 
daily fluctuations in assertiveness covaried positively with 
daily fluctuations in narcissism independently of daily 
fluctuations in status, γ = 0.02, SE = 0.01, t(2,249) = 3.69, 
p  <  .001, 95% CI [0.01, 0.03], and vice versa, γ  =  0.44, 
SE = 0.02, t(2,249) = 27.34, p < .001, 95% CI [0.41, 0.47]. 
Crucially, the indirect effect—quantifying mediation by nar-
cissism—attained significance, ab = 0.003, 95% CI = [0.005, 
0.006]. This finding again supports hierometer theory.
3.5.3 | Did self-esteem mediate the link 
between inclusion and affiliativeness?
Daily fluctuations in inclusion covaried positively with 
daily fluctuations in affiliativeness, γ  =  0.46, SE  =  0.02, 
t(2,250) = 20.79, p < .001, 95% CI [0.42, 0.51]. Furthermore, 
daily fluctuations in affiliativeness covaried positively 
with daily fluctuations in self-esteem independently of 
daily fluctuations in inclusion, γ  =  0.04, SE  =  0.004, 
t(2,249)  =  10.66, p  <  .001, 95% CI [0.03, 0.05], and vice 
versa, γ = 0.36, SE = 0.02, t(2,249) = 14.92, p < .001, 95% 
CI [0.31, 0.40]. Crucially, the indirect effect—quantifying 
mediation by self-esteem—attained significance, ab = 0.10, 
95% CI = [0.08, 0.12]. This finding provides qualified support 
for sociometer theory as self-esteem mediated the inclusion–
affiliativeness link, but the pattern obtained was directionally 
opposite to that hypothesized by sociometer theory.
3.5.4 | Did narcissism mediate the link 
between inclusion and affiliativeness?
As noted above, daily fluctuations in inclusion covaried posi-
tively with daily fluctuations in affiliativeness. However, daily 
fluctuations in affiliativeness did not covary positively with 
daily fluctuations in narcissism independently of daily fluc-
tuations in inclusion, γ = −0.69, SE = 0.01, t(2,249) = 0.99, 
p =  .321, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.02]. In contrast, daily fluctua-
tions in affiliativeness still covaried positively with daily 
fluctuations in inclusion independently of daily fluctua-
tions in narcissism, γ = 0.46, SE = 0.20, t(2,249) = 20.75, 
p < .001, 95% CI [0.42, 0.51]. Crucially, the indirect effect— 
quantifying mediation by narcissism—did not attain signifi-
cance, ab = 0.01, 95% CI =  [−0.001, 0.002]. This finding 
neither supports nor contradicts sociometer theory, to the ex-
tent that sociometer theory does not ascribe a functional role 
to narcissism.
3.5.5 | Discussion
Supporting hierometer theory, on days when participants' 
status was higher (vs. lower), their assertiveness was higher 
(vs. lower) too. In addition, daily fluctuations in both self-
esteem and narcissism mediated the link between daily fluc-
tuations in status and daily fluctuations in assertiveness. This 
supports hierometer theory, and confirms hypothesis (v). 
Contradicting sociometer theory, on days when participants' 
inclusion was higher (vs. lower), their affiliativeness was 
higher (vs. lower) too (the inverse pattern being expected). In 
addition, daily fluctuations in self-esteem, but not narcissism, 
mediated the link between daily fluctuations in inclusion and 
daily fluctuations in affiliativeness. This provides a qualified 
confirmation of hypothesis (vi), as the pattern of mediation 
obtained was directionally opposite to that expected by soci-
ometer theory.
In general, our mediational findings provide evidence of 
self-regard serving a pair of interlinked indicative and im-
perative functions at the within-person level. This is because 
they establish that daily social relations relate to daily in-
terpersonal behavior via daily self-regard—consistent with 
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self-regard acting as a crucial gear in the compensatory or 
consolidatory mechanisms postulated by hierometer theory 
and sociometer theory. Note that the mediational pattern ob-
tained for self-esteem in relation to inclusion and affiliative-
ness is still potentially consistent with self-esteem serving 
some pair of interlinked indicative and imperative functions. 
These findings, moreover, conceptually replicate previous 
ones obtained at the between-person level (Mahadevan et al., 
2016, 2019a, 2019b).
4 |  GENERAL DISCUSSION
We set out to address the question: How do within-person 
fluctuations in daily social relations (i.e., status and inclusion) 
relate to within-person fluctuations in daily self-regard (i.e., 
self-esteem and narcissism) and to within-person fluctuations 
in daily interpersonal behavior (i.e., assertiveness and affili-
ativeness)? Work on status and inclusion has so far focused 
mainly on between-person differences in the two (i.e., how 
one person generally has higher status or is more included 
than another). In contrast, little work has examined within-
person variations in both status and inclusion (i.e., how the 
same person has higher status or is more included on some 
occasions than on others), and how these within-person vari-
ations relate to self-regard and interpersonal behavior. Here, 
we remedied the deficiency: we systematically examined, for 
the first time, how these variables interrelate within-persons 
using a daily diary study, while taking care to scrupulously 
control for between-person baseline individual differences.
The advantages of doing so were fourfold. First, with-
in-person variability is typically substantial in itself, and so 
worth examining in its own right to obtain a more comprehen-
sive and nuanced understanding of psychosocial dynamics as 
a whole. Second, within-person variability is typically pre-
dictive of outcomes independently of between-person vari-
ability, attesting to its theoretical and empirical importance. 
Third, there is no guarantee that, just because a particular 
pattern of findings has emerged at the between-person level, 
it must also appear at the within-person level: independent in-
vestigation at the within-person level is required. Fourth, the 
two theories we used to derive our hypotheses—sociometer 
theory and hierometer theory—are arguably most immedi-
ately tested at the within-person level, by investigating how 
fluctuations in social relations, self-regard, and interpersonal 
behavior mutually covary across days.
4.1 | Summary of findings
Notably, our findings at the within-person level ended up 
conceptually replicating, in every single respect, previous 
findings at the between-person level (Mahadevan et al., 2016, 
2019a, 2019b)—a result that could well have been otherwise. 
First, the hypotheses derived from hierometer theory were 
fully borne out. This theory posits that two types of self- 
regard, self-esteem and narcissism, serve a pair of functions—
indicatively tracking status, and imperatively regulating 
assertiveness—such that higher status increases assertive-
ness by raising self-esteem and narcissism. This process 
involves a consolidatory dynamic (i.e., higher status moti-
vates yet more status-seeking). Consistent with this account, 
(a) daily fluctuations in status covaried positively with daily 
fluctuations in self-esteem and narcissism; (b) daily fluctua-
tions in self-esteem and narcissism covaried positively with 
daily fluctuations in assertiveness; and (c) daily fluctuations 
in self-esteem and narcissism each mediated the positive link 
between daily fluctuations in status and daily fluctuations in 
assertiveness.
Second, the hypotheses derived from sociometer the-
ory were only partly borne out. This theory posits that one 
type of self-regard, self-esteem, serves a pair of functions— 
indicatively tracking inclusion, and imperatively regulating 
affiliativeness—such that lower inclusion increases affil-
iativeness by lowering self-esteem. This process involves a 
compensatory dynamic (i.e., lower inclusion motivates more 
remedial inclusion-seeking). Consistent with this account, 
(a) daily fluctuations in inclusion covaried positively with 
daily fluctuations in self-esteem. However, contrary to this 
account, (b) daily fluctuations in self-esteem covaried posi-
tively (rather than negatively) with daily fluctuations in affil-
iativeness; and (c) daily fluctuations in self-esteem mediated 
the positive (rather than negative) link between daily fluctu-
ations in inclusion and daily fluctuations in affiliativeness.
4.2 | Implications
Our research makes several contributions to theory and re-
search. First, it expands understanding of six constructs 
relevant to many research literatures. These are status and 
inclusion—both key types of social relations (Anderson 
et  al.,  2015; Baumeister & Leary,  1995); self-esteem and 
narcissism—both key types of self-regard (Brummelman 
et al., 2016); and assertiveness and affiliativeness—both key 
types of interpersonal behavior (Moskowitz, 1994). In par-
ticular, our research sheds light on how these variables both 
independently vary, and mutually covary, within-persons. 
We found that each of these variables exhibited substantial 
fluctuation across the span of 10 days. That is, people's social 
relations, self-regard, and interpersonal behavior all exhib-
ited substantial day-to-day “weather,” above and beyond any 
underlying “climate.” These fluctuations, moreover, were 
meaningful: Fluctuations in people's daily status and inclu-
sion related differently to their daily self-esteem and narcis-
sism, as well as to their daily assertiveness and affiliativeness.
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Second, our research has implications for contemporary 
theories of the function of self-regard. In particular, it fur-
nishes a novel source of confirmation, at the within-person 
level, for hierometer theory, which posits that self-regard 
adjusts levels of assertiveness to accommodate current lev-
els of status. All three variables—status, self-regard, and 
assertiveness—shifted together as expected (i.e., rising or 
falling together), with variation in self-regard statistically 
mediating the link between status and assertiveness, con-
sistent with self-regard indicatively tracking the former and 
imperatively regulating the latter. Yet, as regards sociometer 
theory, which posits that self-esteem adjusts levels of affilia-
tiveness to remediate lower levels of inclusion, our research 
furnished a novel source of both confirmation and discon-
firmation at the within-person level. On the one hand, inclu-
sion and self-esteem shifted together as expected (i.e., rising 
or falling together); on the other hand, both shifted together 
with affiliativeness directly counter to expectation (i.e., with 
affiliativeness failing to rise when both fell, and vice versa). 
Nonetheless, variation in self-esteem statistically mediated 
the link between inclusion and affiliativeness, consistent with 
self-esteem indicatively tracking the former and imperatively 
regulating the latter.
What plausible interpretation may be made of these mixed 
findings as regards sociometer theory? Note that, to the ex-
tent that self-esteem serves as the psychological gear that 
links inclusion to affiliativeness, the dynamic involved would 
seem to be—as in hierometer theory—consolidatory rather 
than compensatory. That is, people seemed to behave affili-
atively on occasions when they felt more included, because 
their self-esteem had been buoyed up. If so, then it would be 
a rise, not a drop, in self-esteem, which would incline people 
toward more pronounced prosociality. Yet such a pattern may 
still make evolutionary sense. In particular, a prosocial indi-
vidual who is reliably supportive of others—and is liked and 
accepted as a result—is thereafter more likely to receive re-
ciprocal support from others (Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). 
In contrast, a nonsocial or antisocial individual who fails to 
support or who exploits others—and is disliked and rejected 
as a result—is more likely to be neglected or sanctioned 
under similar circumstances. For the latter individual, then, 
attempts at affiliation may prove pointless or perilous. Hence, 
it is conceivable that a system would evolve to suppress such 
counterproductive attempts, mediated by self-esteem. Note 
too, that that the underlying dynamic can also be construed as 
a risk-minimization maneuver, resembling evolutionary ex-
planations which have been put forward to explain depression 
(Allen & Badcock, 2003). That is, people may only feel con-
fident enough to affiliate with others and risk rejection when 
their self-esteem is high, not when it is low. Our current find-
ings, therefore, join with past findings (Anthony et al., 2007; 
Mahadevan et al., 2016; Twenge et al., 2001, 2007) in offering 
a provocative empirical challenge to the imperative function 
of sociometer theory. True, some experimental research indi-
cates that people faced with the prospect of social exclusion 
express greater interest in making new friends and working 
with others (Maner et al., 2007), and are also more likely to 
conform to group opinions as their self-esteem and sense of 
inclusion fall (Williams et al., 2000). However, other exper-
imental research finds that socially excluded people act less 
prosocially than socially included ones (Twenge et al., 2001, 
2007). In addition, longitudinal research finds that low 
trait self-esteem is a correlate of various types of antiso-
cial behavior (Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & 
Caspi, 2005). Accordingly, follow-up work could further ad-
dress how self-esteem and affiliativeness relate functionally.
4.3 | Strengths, limitations, and 
future directions
The current research had several strengths. As mentioned 
above, it offered a pioneering exploration of how key vari-
ables varied and covaried within-person in light of theories 
pertaining to the function of self-regard. In addition, our 
methodological approach—a daily diary study—had several 
advantageous features. First, it was highly powered, featur-
ing over 2,500 distinct observations. Second, it was ecologi-
cally valid, being conducted in a naturalistic setting. Third, it 
was conducted on a reasonably diverse sample, whose partic-
ipants varied in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, and student/
nonstudent status.
At the same time, the current research also had some lim-
itations. Its design, not being experimental, did not permit 
the drawing of firm causal inferences. That is, the patterns of 
covariation and mediation that emerged were compatible, not 
only with the causal sequences specified by hierometer the-
ory and sociometer theory, but also with reverse sequences. 
Nonetheless, hierometer theory and sociometer theory did 
hypothesize the emergence of some definite patterns rather 
than others (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong,  2005); and on that 
basis, there was ample scope for our findings to either cor-
roborate those theories (as they did in the case of hierometer 
theory) or call them into question (as they partly did in the 
case of sociometer theory). It is also noteworthy that the find-
ings we obtained corresponded closely with those previously 
found using both experimental and correlational designs 
(Mahadevan et al., 2016, 2019a, 2019b), suggesting that they 
are design-independent.
In addition, our daily diary measures involved self- 
report. As such, they were potentially subject to response 
biases, including social desirability, demand characteristics, 
and shared method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff,  2003). We took several steps to minimize such 
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biases. For example, we emphasized confidentiality in the 
study instructions. We also arranged for different measures 
to feature different response formats (e.g., dichotomous op-
tions for social relations and interpersonal behavior; contin-
uous options for self-regard). Nonetheless, future research 
featuring observational methods or informant reports would 
be welcome.
Another potential limitation of our methodology concerns 
the number of measurement occasions used. Participants com-
pleted one survey per day for 10 days, with the average par-
ticipant completing about five daily surveys. Although some 
researchers have adopted the same number of measurement 
occasions (Giacomin & Jordan, 2016a; Heller et al., 2007), 
others have included multiple observations per day over more 
days (Fleeson,  2001; Wilson et  al.,  2017), affording them 
both finer temporal resolution and extended duration. We 
deemed it prudent to measure our six constructs only once 
per day, with dichotomous options for some variables, to 
reduce the risk of participant fatigue; but in so doing, may 
also have failed to capitalize on all the fluctuations in our 
variables that were potentially available. Accordingly, future 
studies might use continuous response formats for all mea-
sures to avoid a loss of information. A related concern may be 
that, because not all participants completed all daily surveys, 
our results could be affected by this omission, especially if 
participants were less likely to complete the surveys on “bad” 
days when their status or inclusion were particularly low. 
Allaying this concern, however, follow-up analyses revealed 
that, with one exception, results were similar for participants 
who completed fewer days versus more days (see Footnote 1). 
In addition, multilevel modeling is generally robust to miss-
ing data (Snijders & Bosker, 2004).
Finally, some caution is warranted regarding the general-
izability of the findings. Our sample comprised more women 
than men. The findings, however, were consistent for both 
women and men (see Supplementary Materials for details). 
Only one moderation effect emerged: The link between daily 
status and daily self-esteem was stronger for women. In ad-
dition, the sample did not permit examining results across 
various subgroups (e.g., students vs. nonstudents, different 
socioeconomic groups, and different ethnic groups), so the 
generalizability of the findings across these and other popu-
lation subgroups remains an open question.
5 |  CONCLUSIONS
Some individuals typically have higher status or are more in-
cluded than others. At the same time, the same individual has 
higher status or is more included on some occasions than on 
others. Grounded in sociometer and hierometer theory, the 
current research examined how these within-person fluctua-
tions in status and inclusion relate to self-regard (self-esteem 
and narcissism) and interpersonal behavior (assertiveness 
and affiliativeness) using a daily diary design. The results in-
dicate that both status and inclusion fluctuate within-person 
from day to day, and relate to daily self-regard and interper-
sonal behavior in different ways. Specifically, self-esteem 
seems to operate as both hierometer and sociometer at the 
within-person level, tracking both status and inclusion and 
prompting both assertiveness and affiliativeness. In contrast, 
narcissism seems to operate chiefly as a hierometer at the 
within-person level, tracking status alone and prompting as-
sertiveness alone. These patterns echo those obtained previ-
ously at the between-person level, with cross-sectional and 
experimental designs. In all, the findings highlight the prom-
ise of examining within-person fluctuations in both status 
and inclusion, and their association with psychological self-
regard and interpersonal behavior, as a means of investigating 
the function of self-regard.
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ENDNOTES
 1 Results were similar for participants who completed fewer days 
versus those who completed more days. We examined each of the 
hypothesized associations with number of days completed as a mod-
erator. Only one significant moderation emerged: The link between 
daily inclusion and daily self-esteem was stronger for participants 
who completed fewer days, γ = −0.10, SE = 0.05, t(2,241) = −2.04, 
p = .042, 95% CI [−0.20, −0.004]. Thus, the results did not generally 
differ by the number of days completed. 
 2 We calculated Cronbach's alphas separately for each daily survey. We 
report the average alpha (across the 10 daily surveys) along with the 
range. 
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 3 Denissen et al. (2008) conducted a cross-lagged analysis alongside 
their HLM analysis. Of their six theoretically relevant analyses—
involving different aspects of social relationships that predicted 
state self-esteem—only one just reached significance at p <  .05; 
the remaining five were marginal or nonsignificant. In view of 
these scant findings, they speculated that “the time lag that we 
analyzed in the current study (i.e., 1 day) was either too short or 
too long to adequately reflect the hypothesized sociometer pro-
cesses (p. 178).” Similarly, Murray, Griffin, Rose, and Bellavia 
(2003, Table 4, p. 73) failed to find any next-day cross-lagged 
effects of acceptance and rejection by romantic partners on state 
self-esteem. Accordingly, we did not expect to find any next-day 
cross-lagged effects in our own data; and exploratory analyses duly 
confirmed our suspicion (see Supplementary Materials). However, 
cross-lagged effects consistent with sociometer theory have been 
obtained at longer time-intervals, such as 1  week (Srivastava & 
Beer, 2005), or 1 year (Reitz et al., 2016), pointing to the possibil-
ity of cumulative effects. 
 4 Level 1 of this model deals with within-person differences. Yij refers 
to observed scores on day i of participant j. This observed score is 
estimated with a regression function where γ0j is the intercept of that 
participant and γ10 represents the regression slope for the predictor 
variable, Xij. The random-effect (error) term eij captures the deviation 
from the predicted score for a specific day and person, normally dis-
tributed with an average of 0 and variance σ2. Level 2 of this model 
deals with between-person differences. Each person's regression in-
tercept γ0j is a function of the overall regression intercept γ00 plus a 
person's deviation from this overall intercept expressed in u0j. This 
deviation, also called random-intercept, is normally distributed with 
a mean of 0 and variance of τ2. 
 5 Note that this result is also consistent with self-broadcasting theory, 
which posits that having higher self-esteem leads to being more in-
cluded by others (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). 
The current study, not being experimental in design, could not de-
termine conclusively whether higher inclusion led to higher self-es-
teem, or whether higher self-esteem led to higher inclusion. However, 
past research using naturalistic longitudinal designs tends to support 
sociometer theory over self-broadcasting theory (Reitz et al., 2016; 
Srivastava & Beer, 2005). That is, higher inclusion by others covaried 
with higher self-esteem over time, whereas higher self-esteem did not 
covary with higher inclusion by others over time. 
 6 Given that paths a and b were treated as fixed effects, there is no 
Level 2 covariance between these parameters. The simple ab product 
is sufficient to quantify the indirect effect (Hayes, 2013). 
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